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Alwmct: This paperdelails how ghosl hunling. as a se1 of learning activities. 
can he used to enhance critical thinking and philo�ophy of science classes. 
We describe in some delail our own work with ghost hunting, and reflect on 
both intended and uninlcnded consequences of lhis pedagogical choice. This 
choice was partly molivatcd by s1uden1s· lack of familiarity with science and 
philo�ophic questions ahout it. We offer reflections on our lhree different 
implcmenlalions of the ghosl hunting activities. In addition. we discuss the 
practical nuances of implementing these activities, as well the relation of 
ghost hunting lo our course content. including informal fallacies and some 
models for scientilic inference. We conclude that employing ghost hunting 
along-side tmdilional activities and contcnl of critical lhinking and philosophy 
of science offers a number of henelits, including being fun, increasing studenl 
altendance, enhancing sludent leaming, and providing a platform for campus 
wide dialogues about philosophy. 
Introduction 
In pursuit of deep learning, it is helpful to ask what sludents can 
do, in order to get a better handle on sometimes foreign and abstract 
ideas. We asked students to go hunting, ghost hunting in this case, to 
supplement the usual lislening, writing, reading, renecting, and note 
taking that regularly occurs in philosophy classrooms. Most students 
laking philosophy classes at our institutions have little contact with 
science beyond the K-12 level, and, in our experience, many of these 
students feel quite uncomfortable with scientific concepts beyond the 
rudiments of scientific inquiry. Additionally, as students engage with 
the idea of correct thinking, it is helpful to provide concrete and inter­
esting examples. We connect ghost hunting to ideas critical to correct 
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reasoning in general, and scientific reasoning in parlicular. in order lo 
illuminate those ideas and understand the nature of (good) scientific 
practice and reasoning. 
After a number of short, collaborative discussions, we built, indepen­
dently. a set of learning activities aimed at enhancing student learning 
regarding some concepts relevant to critical thinking or philosophy of 
science classes, including evidence, rational belief formation. critical 
reasoning, and scientific methodology. The ghost hunting activities arc 
logically consistent with traditional accounls of these concepts, even if 
these traditional accounts often reveal the philosophically problcmalic 
nature of most current ghost hunting practices. We implemented various 
ghost hunting activities, including an experiential one, in the fall of 
20 I 5. The primary goal in Hansel's case, was to apply various crilical 
thinking course content, including methods. to something intcrcsling 
lhat they had done. The primary goal in Koolagc's case was lo provide 
students with an experience in which students would integrate various 
ways of understanding basic philosophical views on the workings of 
science to an experience that is standardly considerc<l to be (.11 best) 
pscu<loscicntific. These experiences also provided a platform for ex­
ploring some of the more abstract philosophic discussions of science. 
without requiring students to have a backgroun<l in the sciences. 
In this paper, we present the various ghost hunting activities we 
designed for our students. The paper also contains a number of obser­
vations regarding these activities in terms of some surprising successes 
and failures. As such, it is primarily a process paper. with observations 
about our own learning activities; we do not lrnvc assessment data to 
share or to support evaluative claims beyond our experience of the 
utility of the activities. In fact. and perhaps not surprisingly, our experi­
ence indicates it would be good to develop a clearer and more precise 
set of learning outcomes and redesign future hunting activities in line 
with our reflections and said assessment. More spccilically. in this 
paper we detail how we connected a ghost hunting activity, treated as 
a set of learning activities, lo philosophy in two distinct areas (critical 
thinking and philosophy of science) using lhrcc distinct approaches: 
(I) as an extracurricular activity connected to an existing course. (2)
as a stand-alone course with ghost hunting as the primary focus, and
(3) as a unit within a course.
The material in this paper is divided into three sections. The first
section explores some of the most compelling reasons for incorpo­
rating ghost hunting into philosophy courses. The second section is 
devoted to exploring ghost hunting at Edgewood College, where it 
was incorporated as an extracurricular activity for an already existing 
course; it describes how ghost hunting was used lo connect in-class 
material with investigations outside of class. This inclu<les a practical 
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discussion of planning and implementing such learning activities, aswell as an in-depth look at how dif
f
erent pieces of traditional criticalthinking course content can be connected to various aspects of ghosthunting. The third section is devoted to exploring ghost hunting atEastern Michigan University, where it was used as stand-alone courseand as a unit within a philosophy of science course. It also <lcscribcsthe practical nuances of implementing ghost hunting activities anddetails how content from a philosophy of science course can be con­nected to ghost hunting. 
Wl,y Use Glws1 Hunting in a Philosophy Class?
There arc number of reasons lo he excited about the prospect of in­corporating ghos1 hunting into one's philosophy classes. The firsl. andmost import�ull, is that ghost hunting connects lo the material we tc.1chin a variety of different ways. We devote the majority of this paper tolinking ghost hunting to deep and difficult topics in the philosophyof science and, al a more intermediate level, lo lhe practice of criticalthinking. Jn this section, we will hriclly <liscuss two .1dditional reasonsin favor nf using ghost hunting in the classroom.
Ghost Hunting is Fun
Ghost hunting is interesting to many of our students. Ghosts and ghnslhun1ing pcrv.1dc popular culture, mid belief in the supernatural is rela­tively high in the United Slates. According to a 2009 Pew ResearchPoll. 18 percent of American adults claim to have seen a ghost, while29 percent believe that they have had contact with a dead person. 1 Furthermore, the proliferation of ghost hunting in television shows(Ghost Hunter.\·, Ghost Adve11t11re.\', etc.). 11lms (Glwstlmsters), andother areas of popular culture is such that even if a student docs notbelieve in ghosts, she is aware of lhc phenomenon. Additionally, taking students on ghost-hunting investigations can beentertaining as well as educaliona/. A typical investigation is done in the dark. in an environment that. while probably not haunted, is imbuedwith a spooky ambiance. There is an atmosphere of adventure allachcdto walking into an empty church sanctuary, in late October, with thelights off, and in the middle of the night. It is 1101 often that one findsphilosophical investigation and adventure linked. It is rewarding to beable to give our studenls an interesting and enjoyable experience, along­side our challenging and oflen highly ahslract philosophical material.
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Ghost Hunting Gets Us Out of the Classroom 
Having a unit on ghost hunting provided philosophy (or, al least, a 
,philosophy department) with some good press on campus. As ghost 
hunting is exciting and a bit weird, word of mouth has spread excite­
ment among the undergraduate population. After one semester of 
incorporating ghost hunting into his critical thinking class, about half 
of Hansel's incoming critical thinking students were already aware of 
the ghost-hunting section and investigations. 
Students arc not the only individuals taking note. The ghost hunti,ng 
investigations at Edgewood College have Ileen met with appreciation 
and (some) excitement from other departments. Notahly, it is the sci­
ence departments that have shown the most inlcrcsl, especially after 
Tim explained lhat he was using ghosl hunting as an example of bcul 
reasoning and pseudoscience. 
This connection lo other departments presents an opportunity to 
introduce philosophy to those who may not be familiar with what we 
teach or study. This also affords us a valuable opportunity to clear up 
possible misconceptions about the material as well. The critical think­
ing, epistemology, and philosophy of science material that we teach our 
students is often compatible with what is being taught by the sciences. 
This sometimes comes. as a surprise to our colleagues from the sciences, 
as some assume that philosophical and scientific methodologies arc 
at odds. These investigations demonstrate that, in many ways, science 
and philosophy arc compatible. With these considerations in mind, we 
decided to incorporate ghost hunting into our teaching at Edgewood 
college (Tim Hansel) and Eastern Michigan University (John Koolagc). 
Ghost Hunting at Edgewood College 
At Edgewood, all students arc required (usually during their first or 
second semester) to take a critical thinking course. I decided that the 
best way to incorporate ghost hunting into my teaching would be to 
augment the sections of critical thinking that I already teach. I had two 
goals in mind as I went forward: First, I wanted to afford students an 
opportunity to apply critical thinking material to real-world scenarios 
(ghost hunting is a thing that happens, even if there arc no ghosts). 2 
Second, I wanted to introduce students to the more in-depth philosophy 
of science material in a manner that was accessible to predominantly 
first-year students. So, I augmented my critical thinking course by 
focusing (a bit) on ghosts and the supernatural inside the classroom, 
and I set up an cxtracurrtcular ghost hunting group to meet, discuss, 
and investigate. B�low, I describe these clements in some detail. 
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Connecting Ghost Hunting to a Pre-Existing Course 
My use of ghost hunting in the classroom began in the Fall Semester 
of 2015. I made no changes to the basic structure of the course itself. 
As critical thinking is about the evaluation of belief (both ordinary 
and extraordinary), the material regarding how to think critically about 
beliefs remained basically the same. What was diff crent for my class, 
was the focus on supernatural beliefs and evidence we may (or may 
not) have for them. For example, when we discussed the reliability 
(and unreliability) of personal experience, I would focus on purported 
first-hand supcrnaturnl experiences. If we were discussing explanations, 
we would look at ghostly and other supernatural explanations and 
ask whether we had any reason to believe them over more mundane 
explanations. 
Much of what we did regarding paranormal beliefs and ghost 
hunting occurred outside of class. This was deliberate. As [ was not 
substantially revising my slandard critical thinking course, it would 
be inappropriale to do too much in the classroom beyond applying the 
standard material, from time to time, to the question of the supernatu­
ral. Furthermore, students had no reason to expect a class with such a 
focus, and the topic can make some students uncomfortable.] Finally, 
as the critical thinking course is meant to be introductory, I wanted 
to make the more high-level philosophy of science material optional. 
Also, our activities outside of class were often used as examples and 
discussion topics inside of class. Additionally, I occasionally shared 
anecdotes and pieces of evidence from our investigations and onlinc 
discussions with the class when relevant. 
As this was all extracurricular, I needed to consider the time com­
mitment that such a project would require. My goal was to offer four 
to five meetings, investigations, and other events per semester. The 
events typically last about two hours, so I planned for approximately 
ten hours of work outside of the class with students, along with another 
ten hours for the planning and organization of these events. Obviously, 
more or less time could be devoted to such a project if one wanted to 
offer a different number of events. 
In order lo gauge student interest in the topic, I first set up a Face­
book group devoted to ghost hunting at Edgewood. We named the group 
the Edgewood Center for Thaumaturgic Observation (ECTO). About 
half of my twenty critical thinking students signed up for the group, 
along with others who had heard about the group. We ended up with 
nineteen student members in the group in the first semester. On the 
group page, I posted the more in-depth philosophy of science readings 
for later discussion.� We also· used the page to plan investigations and 
discuss any evidence from those invesligations (and elsewhere). 
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Investigations 
In the fall of 20 I 5, we performed two investigations in the manner of 
those performed on television programs like Ghost Ad11e11111res. 5 The 
first was on campus during daylight hours. We met in a wooded area 
on campus to investigate rumors that the campus's effigy mounds were 
haunted. Eleven (out of a possible twenty) students came to this inves­
tigation. As it was our first go at such a thing, we spent most of our 
time familiarizing ourselves with the typical ghost-hunting gear (cam­
eras, voice-recorders, EM field detectors, and Infrared thermometers). 
The second investigation took place at an older church chapel (also 
rumored to be haunted) wi1hin walking dis1ancc of campus. The church 
gave us permission to stay the entire night on the premises and gave 
us complete acces,,; to the sanctuary and fellowship areas. During this 
investigation. we did experience some initially very spooky phenomena 
that required explanation. The most interesting was an image captured 
by one of the cameras that appeared to show a figure in the choir loft. 
The studenls decided that ii was not supernatural. In fact. they con­
cluded that it was merely reflected light from the flash of the camera. 
One key clement to the .<;ucccss of these investigations as a learn­
ing activity was facilitating discussions regarding the connection of 
the hunts to relevant readings and class topics. Before and after the 
investigations. we would have conversations about what we had been 
reading regarding the nature of scientific investigation. and whether 
what we were doing would constitute legitimate scientific inquiry (sec 
Koolagc's two questions in his section. "Ghost Hunting at Eastern 
Michigan University," below). We would also examine any data that 
had been collected or submitted. Through our conversations, we noted 
that one of the biggest challenges facing ghost hunting was how to 
come up with a testable hypothesis. Students were interested in the 
notions of falsiliability and testability (sec the next section), but had 
difficulty coming up with hypotheses that had any predictive content 
that could be tested during our investigations. The other major theme 
of our discussions related to spooky phenomena caught on tape and 
camera. Conversations inevitably lead to questions about competing 
hypotheses. We had numerous discussions focused on inference to the 
best explanation and likelihoods (sec below for more detail) to try to 
sort out what explanations (hypotheses) were most likely to be true. 
Other discussion and meetings occurred that were not directly relat­
ed to ghost hunting, but continued the theme of the supernatural. In the 
fall of 2016, the ECTO grou·p held an on campus event where students 
and faculty were encouraged to share their own ghost stories. We then 
discussed the reliability of such testimony and whether such stories 
could ever provide sufficient justification for supernatural beliefs. In 
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the appeal to authority/testimony section below, we provide more detail 
on the issue of the reliability of ghost stories and supernaiural reports. 
Connecting Ghost Hunting to Critical Thinking Content
At Edgewood, part of the purpose of having the extracurricular ghosthunting events outside of class was to allow students to lind greaterdepth within the philosophy of science. However, much of what hap­pened (inside and outside of the classroom) connected to the basicmethodological clements that one finds in a standard critical thinkingcourse. At thb level, greater focus is given to understanding conceptsand less to genuine philosophical debates. For instance, although criticalthinking lextbooks almost universally cover inductive reasoning, veryfew mention the problem of induction. For my class. we use LewisVaughn ·s, Tlte Poll'er r�f Criticlll Tlti11ki11,:.'' In this section, we willbriefly discuss how variow, clements of a standard critical thinkingcourse fit with ghost hunting. In the next section. we will discuss inmuch greater detail how the phenomena fits with various topics in thephilosophy of science. 
l,!fere11ce to the Best £\71/a11mio11
In Tim Hansel's critical thinking courses, a third of the semester fo­cuses on inductive reasoning with an emph.1sis on inference to the bestexplanation (IBE), scientific methodology, and cpistcmology.7 The useof ghosts and ghost hunting (in and out of class) allows us to applyall of the techniques for evaluating inductive inferences regarding �up­posed supernatural phenomena.
Inference to the best explanation is the inductive inference that hasthe most relevant connection to ghost hunting.� Herc is the inferenceto the best explanation argument as found in Vaughn's The Power ofCritical Thi11ki11g: 
I. Phenomenon Q.
2. E provides the hcst explanation for Q.3. Therefore. it is probable lhat E is true
In teaching IBE, most of the work comes from trying to unpackwhat it means for one explanation to be belier than another. At an in­troductory level, this comes down to which explanation best emhodicscertain explanatory virtues. These virtues typically include simplicity,conservatism, con,;istency, testability, and the like.When ghoc;t hunting and during discussions in and outside of class.we consider competing explan.,tions for the various ghostly phenomenathat we have experienced throughout the semester. Some of it occursduring inveMigations. and some of it comes from other sources. Wethen, through discussion and writing assignments, try to apply our
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evaluative tools to making an inference to the best explanation (if 
possible). 
Herc's an example: during the Spring 2016 semester, a student 
posted pictures of an 'orb' on the ECTO Faccbook page. After secur­
ing the student's permission to discuss the evidence in class, I used 
these photographs to talk about the best explanation for the reddish 
ball that was visible in a photograph of some artwork in the lounge 
of one of the on-campus residence halls. The student claimed that it 
was a visual manifestation of a spirit. Furthermore, according to the 
student. the redness of the orb indicated that it was a "protector" spirit. 
During this discussion, we noted that several more mundane expla­
nations (renected light, camera glitch. dust on lens) did just as well, 
if not better than the supernatural one from the standpoint of the ex­
planatory virtues. For instance, the mundane examples were all superior 
to the supernatural explanation in that they were more conservative 
and simple. They were conservative in that they described phenomena 
that fit well with what is already well-established (e.g .• we know how 
light renections interact with camera lenses). Furthermore, mundane 
examples arc simpler, as they do not need to posit extra ontological 
baggage to explain what we observe. Though as a group we were un­
able lo settle on one "best" explanation, we were all relatively sure 
that the supernatural explanation was unlikely lo be true, given the 
adequacy of competing mundane explanations. 
Fallacies 
Most critical thinking courses include some discussion of informal and
formal fallacies. In the critical thinking courses at Edgewood, when I
discuss informal fallacies, I often note their appearance in arguments
and beliefs about ghosts and other supernatural phenomena. Below
are five common fallacies as they relate lo supernatural beliefs. This
list is not exhaustive, it merely provides some examples of how the
conversations look when connected to the material.
One fallacy that is often committed when reasoning about super­
natural entities and phenomena is the appeal to ignorance fallacy. This
fallacy occurs when someone mistakes the lack of negative evidence for
positive evidence. In class, I had a student who believed in ghosts tell
me, referring to some supposed piece of evidence of the supernatural,
to prove that it wasn't caused by a ghost. Such a classic appc<;1l to the
ignorance fallacy afforded a great teachable moment.
A second fallacy that often comes up in discussions of ghost hunt­
ing is the appeal to authority or testimony. Arc the people on Ghost
Adve11111res (or any of the other TV shows) experts? How about the
author of Tire Evayt/iing Glwst H11111ing Book'!' What should we say
about anyone who has claimed to have seen a ghost? The appeal to
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authority fallacy occurs when someone imparts an unreasonable amount 
of credibility to the testimony of individuals. Whether ghost hunters' 
(or others') testimony is reliable is an extremely fruitful conversation. 
When discussing testimony in a critical thinking course, we go into 
some detail about whether we have reason to believe that the testifier 
is in a position to know the information they arc claiming, and whether 
the testifier is being sincere. With accounts of supernatural events, 
these issues can come into stark relief. When we hear a ghost story 
from a ghost hunter. student, or any other source, we immediately ask 
several questions. Did the testifier truly sec what she said she saw? For 
example, was it a human figure in the doorway or the mind playing 
tricks? Docs she have any reason to fabricate or embellish her account? 
Even if there were no mistakes or embellishments. does that mean a 
more mundane explanation is ruled out? Given the shortcomings of 
testimonial accounts of supernatural phenomena, we can cmpha.c;ize 
the need for more direct (and adequate) evidence for the supernatural. 
Formal fallacies make an appearance as well. A third common 
fallacy is that of a false dilemma or f alsc choice, which occurs when 
we present a number options as though they exhaust the possibilities 
when, in facl, they do not. Again, this kind of thinking occurs often 
when discussing the supernatural. Herc is the thinking: we have ruled 
out one possible mundane explanation; therefore, ghosts! Clearly, this 
is fallacious reasoning. 
A fourth, is an appeal to emotion or wishful thinking. All critical 
thinking courses warn against emotion. That is to say, that our emo­
tions can, at times, interfere with our ability to think rationally. One 
of my favorite examples of this fallacy is wi.r;hful thinking. I tell my 
students that I want ghosts to be real. Growing up in the I 980's, all 
I wanted in the world was to be a ghostbustcr (I still kind of do), but 
wanting something lo be true is irrelevant to something being true. We 
must be careful that we do not believe things simply because it makes 
the world a more interesting place. 
The fifth fallacy that easily connects to supernatural belief is cog­
nitive biases. Cognitive biases arc those psychological impediments 
that can sometimes misrepresent the world and evidence to us. Being 
aware of these biases, like being aware of errors in reasoning, will 
(hopefully) allow us lo minimize error. One of the more interesting 
of the biases to cover in a critical thinking class is pareidolia. Pare­
idolia occurs when we experience patterns and structure from random 
stimulation. Purported evidence for ghosts and the supernatural arc 
considered classic examples of parcidolia. Seeing faces in the grain of 
a photograph or hearing voices in the noise of a recording (known as 
Electronic Voice Phenomenon or EVP) may just be our mind playing 
this very specific kind of trick on us. 
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Ghost Hunting at Eastern Michigan University 
Ghost Hunting as a Stand Alone Course 
In Winter 2015, our Introduction to University course added a one 
credit hour lab. taught by faculty. I proposed a lab that focused on 
the question 'what is science?' From a discussion of this proposal, 
the idea of a focus on the demarcation of science and pseudoscience 
emerged. I had previously taught sections of Pltilo.wr1hy of Science 
a11CI The Occ11lt as part of a philosophy of science course, and when 
ghost hunting appeared to be exciting to the Introduction lo University 
design group, I began preparing the lab.'° When I met with Tim in the 
summer of 2015. our collecti\'e interest in thinking about ghost hunt­
ing in terms of philosophy of science and critical thinking scaled the 
deal. The ghost hunting lab for Introduction to University occurred in 
our Fall 2015 semester, and was completed in eight class sessions. or 
roughly twelve hours of class time. 
Ghost Hunting as a Unit within a Class 
The third model, where ghost hunting is used as a unit in a course, 
was instantiated in Winter 2016 in my Philosophy of Science class (a 
400/500 level course). A typical issue that emerges in philosophy of 
science classes is that students arc surprisingly unfamiliar with the 
sciences and scientific practice. 11 I opted to scale down my Introduc­
tion to University ghost hunting unit as a response lo this challenge. 
The unit took 4 weeks of class time, and was also connected to a unit 
on scientific realism. 
The two models differed in a number of ways, especially in terms 
of their student populations and the teaching and learning needs of 
students at very diff erenl levels. I will focus here on the commonalities, 
especially the experiential component. Both models included a ghost 
hunting experience, which will be described below. In both models, 
students were divided into groups of three to five. Both models also 
required students to give group presentations, wherein they reported 
on their methods and findings. In particular, students were asked to 
offer their own connection between the experiential component, the 
scientific inference patterns deployed, and whether ghost hunting is a 
science. Additionally, the groups were given a worksheet intended to 
facilitate making useful connections between ghost hunting (as prac­
ticed) and course contcnt. 11 
The ghost hunts required about two hours of additional preparation. 
At the time, Starkweather was the home of the Honors College and 
General Education. I contacted both groups lo be sure that my ghost 
hunters traipsing through wouldn't be a problem. In the second iteraw 
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lion, both groups had moved out of Starkweather, so 1 had a number of 
discussions with our physical plant regarding the u.c;c of, and access to, 
the building. Students were encouraged to get ghost hunting gadgetry, 
which (interestingly) is available at the local public libraries. 
Investigations 
For the experiential component or the unit, students were asked to 
proceed with a scientific inquiry into the possible haunting of East­
crn's Starkweather Hall. The Hall is rumored to be haunted by Mary 
Starkwcather's ghost, and plenty of material regarding this haunting 
is available on the web. 11 I secured access to Starkweather Hall during
our regular class time. After all, what scientist would operate under 
sub-optimal epistemic conditions, like darkness? Students were encour­
aged lo get ghost hunting equipment, available at the Ann Arbor public 
libraries, and were required lo read The Et•et)'lhing Ghost H1111ti11g Book
in prcparation. 14 Only two groups brought technical gear, but mosl
students brought some sort of detection and recording devices (phones, 
cameras, and in one case an old school tape recorder). Honestly, the 
students took this endeavor pretty seriously, and it was fun to watch 
them proceed in a manner they thought a ghost hunter should. 
Connecting Ghost Hunting lo Philosophy of Science Content 
There is a host of traditional philosophy of science content that can 
be connected to ghost hunting, but my classes focused on questions 
of scientific epistemology-the patterns of inference involved in jus­
tifying (undcrstom.l broadly) scientific claims (hypotheses). The pair 
of organizing questions [ used for my courses arc as follows: (I) if a 
ghost hunter were a scientist, how would she proceed? And, (2) how 
docs this scientist ghost hunter match actual ghost hunter practice'! 
In order to answer the lirst question, my class focused on these 
questions: what arc some proposed hallmark forms of scientific rea­
soning, how well can we translate these to dealing with ghost hunting, 
and what do these translations reveal about our understanding (or lack 
thereof) of the hallmark forms of reasoning? In order to answer the 
second question, we read about and went ghost hunting. 
Overall, the experiential component of my ghost hunting activities 
was well received by students. Many of them took the hunt very seri­
ously, and had a good deal of fun weaving through the creepy basement 
of Starkweather. Every group did the legwork lo understand the nature 
of the possible haunting of Starkweather. All the groups did an excellent 
job of using the handout associated with the ghost hunt. The students 
also bonded, which certainly made discussions and group work after 
the ghost hunt itself notably more casual and trusting. It w.1s a lot of 
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fun to sec them making use of various ghost hunting paraphernalia and 
some entertaining preconceptions about ghost hunting. Additionally, 
the ghost hunting class sessions had I 00 percent attendance, which is 
not the case for the more typical lecture/discussion sessions. 
The greatest failure of this experiment is that I did not directly 
connect the key (content based) learning outcomes to the activity for 
the students. I had assumed that they would come lo this on their own, 
but it did not really happen. I had expected that students would use 
the various tools at their dii-;posal (the models of scientific inference 
offered below) to discover the main problem for ghost hunting: the 
standard observations associated with the presence of ghosts arc not 
linked to hypotheses about ghosts in a way that would be considered 
scientific by any of the philosophers of science we discussed in the 
lecture/discussion clements of the course. I presented them with a 
number of accounts regarding the connection between observations and 
hypotheses, and the nature of hypotheses, and I was really hoping that 
students would make this connection on their own. In retrospect, that 
was a missed opportunity. Students would have moved more deeply 
and more quickly into the material if this outcome had been made 
explicit. When I do this again, I will simply tell students that a central 
philosophic puzzle here is to find a relation between the models of 
scientific reasoning and the process of ghost hunting (and, if one can't 
be found so much the worse for one or the other). That is, ghost hunting 
can only be a science if its primary reasoning patterns are scientific, 
or, conversely, we can learn about the nature of scientific inference 
where standard models fail to capture ghost hunting. Of course, most 
student realized that they were to critique ghost hunting as a science 
using the inference patterns (models) presented, but it is clear from 
my teaching experience that the connection of the hunt and the models 
of science would have been more useful to the overall course if this 
connection were made for them. In short, greater transparent alignment 
is required in this area. 
Are Ghosts the Kind of Thing that Is Excluded from Scientific 
Evaluation a priori? 
It is very common to think that science requires Naturalism, or even 
Physicalism. I am extremely skeptical that science requires either of 
these. It is also very common to think that science is identified by the 
objects studied, namely natural objects. Since it could easily he argued 
that ghosts conform to none of these three common views of science, 
ghost hunting is a priori out of bounds as scientific investigation, 
and in turn not possibly a science. While this section appears first, I 
taught this section last; students, unlike professional philosophers, are 
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not particularly concerned that ghosts might be outside of scientific 
boundaries, especially if they are learning about ghosts and philosophy 
of science in a classroom. Additionally, the readings for discussion arc 
high level and use some of the language and ideas presented in the 
reasoning pattern sections. 
Naturalism 
The concept I have in mind here is the one that suggests that science 
must eliminate or avoid supernatural objects in its theories. If this is 
correct, then it is extremely difficult to sec how ghost hunting could 
be a science. Naturalism (of this sort) docs appear to be a part of the 
recent history and practice of science, but a priori rules placed on 
admission to the scientific endeavor arc notoriously difficult to justify 
and have a mixed track record. 
The three readings I used to generate some discussion on this topic 
were (I) Elliott Sober's Philosophy r�f /Jiolo;:y, chapter 2, (2) Saber's 
"Evolution without Naturalism," and (3) Kristin Andrews's Tlie Animal 
Mind, chapter 2. 15 
Andrews's chapter provides two discussion items relevant 10 this 
topic. She considers, in a careful and accessible manner, Morgan's 
Canon. u, The Canon has been a central principle in animal ethology for 
some time, and it suggests we should never explain animal behavior 
by appeal to higher order cognitive processes (e.g., the manipulation 
of beliefs) when they can be explained using perceptual systems and 
processes (e.g .• affordances, which arc characterized by a harmony 
between perceptual mechanisms and the world itselO. The Canon has 
been treated as an a priori principle in animal ethology, and Andrews 
argues that it is not a justified principle. In this discussion, she also 
considers behaviorism, another tradition with an a priori prohibition 
on certain kinds of hypotheses. 17 Both discussions provide ample op­
portunity to discuss the idea that scientific hypotheses are judged on 
the basis of evidence, not a priori prohibitions. Andrcws's chapter also 
provides an appeal to a certain level of expertise in framing observa­
tions about unfamiliar phenomena. She suggests that avoiding epistemic 
errors, such as anthropomorphizing animal behavior, do not require 
a priori prohibitions, they simply require a level of familiarity and 
careful observation of the phenomena in question. In my experience, 
this conversation docs not have any particular end game in terms of 
ghost hunting, but it opens students' eyes to the role of philosophers 
in thinking about good scientific reasoning. 
Elliott Sobcr's article, "Evolution without Naturalism," is more 
straightforwardly relevant to the discussion. 18 In this article, Sober 
provides some tools for talking about various kinds of Naturalism, 
but more importantly he demonstrates why particular religious beliefs. 
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such as the existence or God, are simply nol al odds with the evidence 
(and justification) for evolutionary theory. Sober deploys the Bayes­
ian framework and the likelihood theory or evidence to show that the 
existence or non-existence or God is simply not al issue in the testing 
of evolutionary theory. Additionally, he provides a nice discussion 
about the role of mathematical objects in science, and further claims 
that numbers arc similarly not being tested when evolutionary models 
arc being tested. The relevance lo the ghost hunting questions is that 
Naturalism is not a requirement of, nor is it a justified principle for 
doing. good science. 
Chapter 2 or Sober's Philosophy of Biology, which by now I would 
have taught in an earlier section of the class, marks an important return 
to earlier learning.•� In this section, I focus on how he is not ruling 
oul Creationism with some principle; he is arguing that Creationism 
is either (a) a failed science, (b) not proceeding in a scientific manner 
(generating testable auxiliaries), or (c) at best a degenerative research 
program (no new hypotheses or predictions). 
In all, the suggestion that Naturalbm provides us with a reason to 
dismiss ghost hunting a priori is not a promising line or reasoning. 
and seems to miss some important features of scientific inquiry. This 
section also provides a nice avenue for talking with students about 
some of the limits of scientific inquiry and placing science nicely in 
a community of knowledge disciplines, rather than leaving science as 
a monolith of human inquiry. 20 
PhysicaUsm 
Many philosophers find physicalism extremely plausible, and many 
people take physicalism or an assumption of physicalism to put ghost 
hunting out of the runnii:ig as a science. This view can be (roughly) 
summarized as follows: all that really exists arc the objects described 
by a correct physics. Most students do not ascribe to this view, but it 
is worth mentioning in the discussion of Ghost Hunting. 
Antony Flcw's essay "Parapsychology: Science or Pseudoscience?" 
argues that most parapsychology, which, broadly construed, would 
include ghost hunting, rest� on an outmoded Cartesian assumption of 
Dualism.21 While I did not address this in my offerings of lhe ghost 
hunting unit, I imagine many would find this an interesting and helpful 
discussion. If physicalism (or some sort of eliminative materialism) is 
correct, then it is impossible that ghost hunters arc hunting anything 
that would resemble a commonsense notion of ghosts. 
An obvious response to this worry is that biologists do not investi­
gate particles, forces, and the void, and yet biology is clearly a science. 
There arc two problems with this line of defense for ghosl hunting, 
though: (I) biology may supervene on the physical, and (2) biology is 
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at, the very least, not logically incompatible with physicalism. There is 
much to say here, but for students being introduced to the philosophy 
of science, I took three lines on this discussion. First, the idea that 
physicalism places a constraint on what counts as science has all the 
same navor of the a priori rule found in the discussion of Naturalism. 
Second, I did nol address the notion of supcrvcnicnce. Additionally, 
the question of supervening is largely a metaphysical point, rather than 
an epistemic one. That said, this issue can be addressed (roughly) in 
a discussion of this question: do all sciences, ultimately. need to be 
reducible to physics'! I directed students to an idea I have been calling 
'Theoretic Actualism.' The idea here is that we arc only able to believe 
theories we do have, since it is ridiculous to ask current knowers to 
believe theories they have never heard (or may never hear). Currently, 
there is no reduction between concepts found in sciences, such as biol­
ogy, to concepts in physics. For example, we cannot translate the study 
of predation to the study of Schrodingcr's equation; so, for now, we 
ought to accept that the two sciences, biology and physics in this case, 
offer us predictively successful (and possibly truth tracking) accounts 
of the world, and that the relation between the two sciences is largely 
unknown. Third, biology and physics arc compatible in their current 
form because they (mostly) do not have overlapping domains. This is 
not so for ghost hunting and physics. It seems that gho,st hunting (at 
least) requires us to accept that there arc other things than what phys­
ics names as the most f undamcntal elements of our world. Ir there are 
spirit things thal have impacts on physical things, we have a puzzle. 
Docs physics tell us about the world at the rock bottom, or do we 
need other "sciences" to tell us about that? Again there is much to 
say on this matter, but I focused lhe discussion on this set of points: 
( 1) Physicalism seems to ask us to admit that physics trumps other
potential or actual sciences; so, if two theories arc incompatible, phys­
ics (or those compatible with physics) always wins. (2) It is actually
not obvious (for reasons we will discuss in subsequent sections) that
ghost hunting is incompatible with physics. An example l have found
useful in this discussion is Alfred Wcgencr's theory of continental drift.
Wegener was the first to offer a sustained defense of the movement of
the Earth's crust, but he faced serious opposition from the physicists of
his time.21 The physicists argued that there could be no Earthly force
strong enough lo move the hlock of earth making up England through
the block of earth making up the scanoor in the opposite direction
of Greenland. Given the sciences of the time, lhc physicists seemed
completely in the right, though Wcgcncr's data suggested the physicists
had to be wrong. Should data or theory settle this question'! History
demonstrates that Wcgcner's ideas were pursued, dc�pite the conllict
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with physics, and eventually became mainstream science. though in
the form of a newer theory, plate tectonics.
The Objects of Science
Obviously "ghost" is not a theoretical term in any standard science.
We have terms such as orbit, force, virtual particle, cognition, post­
traumatic stress disorder, ecosystem, adaptation, planet, and so on, but
not ghost. Some arc inclined to think that the sciences arc determined
by what the science studies-its objects. If that is so, then ghosts
arc not the kind of thing about which there is a science. This line of
thought can be displayed by tracking the Facebook mcmc 'I fucking
love science,' wherein cool natural objects (critters, events, and places)
arc celebrated under the name 'science.'
I find a discussion of Larry Laudan's Pessimistic Mela-Induction
helpful in a number of ways, so most of my students hear about this
set of ideas at one point or anothcr.21 In both models of my leaching
of ghost hunting, 1 had already taught this, but I will describe it here,
as it addresses the exclusion of ghosts from science on the grounds
that they arc not current theoretical posits of any science.
Science cannot be defined (in any sense) by the objects it investi­
gates. In Laudan's article, "A Confutation of Convergent Realism," he
lays out a number of examples that nicely demonstrate that the objects
of science change, often quite dramatically, over time. 
24 I often pick
an example or two depending on the interests of the class, but some
examples include electromagnetic ether, phlogiston, Aristotle's cle­
ments, clan vital, the Hippocratic humors, and so on. Of course, it is
equally interesting to demonstrate that new objects arc also being added
to the scientific corpus on a regular basis, for example gravitons, mir­
ror neurons/systems, and nomad planets. This discussion is typically
fairly quick; however, it introduces students to the idea that sciences
do not produce a set of fixed facts, and directs them to a much more
important idea-science is more likely to be identified ("defined") by
its methods, not the set of objects it currently investigates using its
current set of concepts.
Abduction 
The term 'abduction' is ambiguous. In this section of my ghost hunting
unit, I talk about abduction in terms of hypotheses, rather than explana
­
tions or probabilistic inference. Henry Frankfurt's article, "Peirce's N
o­
tion of Abduction," provides a basis for discussion.25 Frankfurt argu
es
that Peirce's account of abduction provides two, mutually incompatib
le,
conceptualizations. On the one hand, his view is that abduction fun
­
damentally involves some sort of flash of insight-a creative proces
s
that admits of no parlicular rules and invokes an imaginative proces
s.
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On the other hand, Peirce conceives abduction as a specific sort of 
inference pattern. On this way of thinking, Pierce provides us with an 
inference of the following form: 
I. The surprising fact C is observed.
2. If A were true, C would be a matter of course.
3. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
Frankfurt emphasizes this point: an inference admits of rules and in­
cludes all of the concepts required lo evaluate it. As a result, this way 
of thinking about abduction is, thus, doubly at odds with the flash of 
insight account. Frankfurt concludes that this second way of thinking 
about abduction is most useful and faces the fewest problematic chal­
lenges. Furthermore, he takes the proper analysis of this conception of 
abduction to be as follows: abduction is the logic by which we recog­
nize a proposition to be a hypothesis. Pul another way, it provides a 
baseline for scientific reasoning. If science is "defined" by the lcsting 
of hypotheses. we must have a way of recognizing what constitutes 
a hypothesis. On Frankfurt's analysis the inference reads as follows: 
I. The surprising fact C is observed.
2. If A were true, C would be a matter of course.
3. Hence, we recognize that A is a hypothesis about C.
I have found it useful to point out that abduction is a fairly weak in­
ference; as a result. it cannot be the only sort of scientific inference. 
A successful abduction gives us no more reason to believe its conclu­
sion than some competitor that also makes an observation a matter 
of course. Using historical examples, it is easy to demonstrate these 
issues. Consider any of the ancient Greek explanations for natural phe­
nomena, which would make various observations a matter of course. 
This also opens the opportunity for a discussion of what 'a matter of 
course' might designate. Docs it analyze as a form of least surprise? 
Or something more complicated, such as predictive success? 
As far as the discussion of ghost hunting is concerned, I have found 
that abduction, in this second conceptualization, is absolutely critical. 
If the ideal ghost hunter were a scientist, how would she proceed'? She 
would most assuredly want to formulate hypotheses that make standard 
ghostly phenomena a mailer of course if there arc ghosts. If left to 
their own devices, students puzzle over how to go about ghost hunting 
and simply try whatever strikes them as the usual methods or whatever 
bizarre notions TV shows and the internet offer. This represents a fail­
ure to understand the lesson of abduction. To have a science of ghost 
hunting, one must start with hypotheses. A good hypothesis would 
tell us how the existence of ghosts makes the appearance of "orbs" in 
photographs, gooscbump inducing sounds, the presence of "chatter" on 
a tape recorder, or lhc presence of "ectoplasm" a matter of course! I am 
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not skeptical that a clever ghost hunter could resolve such a problem, 
since the abductive inference is not particularly strong. Thal said, this 
is not standard procedure for ghost hunters. To demonstrate this, one 
can return to what is said about ghost hunting in popular texts, such 
as The Everything Ghost H11111i11g Book by Melissa Martin Ellis.u, 
Of particular concern in this discussion is what makes something 
a matter of course. I asked students to generate some potential prin­
ciples for this idea. Students generated suggestions that came close to 
the following three ideas: (I) minimization of surprise or meeting or 
expectations, (2) fit with data, or (3) fruitfulness. Connecting this to 
the ghost hunting activity is reasonably straightforward. The postula­
tion of ghosts must make some set of observations (creepy sounds, 
the appearance of "orbs" in photos, and so on) either (I) expected or 
unsurprising, (2) highly probable, or (3) useful for the generation of 
additional questions and further inquiry. The ensuing discussion focused 
on the nature of these ideas. The first is at least a psychological prin­
ciple, the second is epistemic (and I return to it below), and the third 
is pragmatic. My classes f ocuscd on the second criterion, since it is 
central to the discussion of Likelihoodism. To repeat an earlier lesson 
from my use of the ghost hunting activity, it would be helpful to have 
students explore the idea that there must be some sort of connection 
(preferably epistemic) between the data one has (or will have) and the 
hypothesis that there arc ghosts. In this way, students can begin to sec 
that there arc some serious problems with the possibility that currently 
practiced ghost hunting is a science, while simultaneously addressing 
the idea that the inf ercnces of science arc part of what makes it an 
important, and philosophically interesting, mode of inquiry. 
This discussion also provides a nice introduction to thinking about 
stronger inference patterns: exactly how arc hypotheses and data con­
nected such that the latter epistemically supports the former. The first 
pass at some principles of connection provides students with some 
insight into a key puzzle in the philosophy of science. 
Falsi ficalionism 
The weakness of abduction leads nicely to a discussion of Popper's 
Falsificationism. The desire lo rule out hypotheses that capture various 
phenomena (make them a matter of course), but are bizarre or unhelpful, 
appears o.bvious after students grasp the basics of abduction. The fact 
that Hades's anger would make volcanic eruptions a matter of course 
is usually sufficient to convince students of the need for a stronger 
inference in (most) scientific inquiry. 
Popper's piece, "Science: Conjectures and Refutation," serves as a 
good way to introduce the standard reading of Popper's Falsification­
ism. n This piece also provides an opportunity to look at some views 
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that remain popular, including Marxism and Freudianism; Popper 
critiques these as unscientific on the grounds that they do not have 
falsifiable content. 
Popper's falsification follows a familiar format, Modus Tollens: 
I. If H (hypothesis) is true, then O (observation) is true.
2. 0 is false.
3. Therefore, H is false.
Hypotheses arc linked to a set of observations. This set is sometimes 
known as the hypothesis's empirical consequence class. Popper cap­
tures Peircc·s notion of making the observation 'a matter of course' 
with material implication. Thal is, if the hypothesis is true, then we 
will observe clements of the hypothesis's empirical consequence class. 
In this way, hypotheses arc falsifiable. If we observe the negation of 
clements of the hypothesis's empirical consequence class, then the 
hypothesis is false. If there arc no empirical consequences that could 
render the hypothesis false, it is unfalsifiable and not scientific ac­
cording lo Popper. 
ll is easy enough to demonstrate why sciences arc engaged in fal­
sification, rather than proof, when material implication does the work. 
Consider the 'proof' argument: 
I. If 1-1 is true, then O is true.
2. 0 is true.
3. Therefore, H is true.
This is an instance of affirming the consequent-a logical fallacy. 
In my class, I introduce two problems for Falsificationism. First, 
corroboration (what happens when we do an experiment and we don't 
get the result that O is false) docs not capture our intuitions about good 
hypotheses. Corroboration never tells us if the hypothesis is true, or 
even approximately true; it merely tells us that the hypothesis is not 
false. This result clashes with our intuition that a highly corroborated 
hypothesis is much better than one that has only been put to task a 
few times. This 'much better' notion cannot be measured in terms of 
truth. So, we arc left with a puzzle-can this normative term ('much 
better') be cashed out in meaningful epistemic terms (that do not have 
to do with truth), and if not, what docs it mean to engage in scientific 
inquiry? I have left this as a puzzle for students to explore, though, so 
far, none have taken it up in final papers. Second, I introduce Quine­
Duhem undcrdetcrmination as a problem for Popper's Falsilicationism, 
which is detailed below. 
Clever students often notice that material implication is not particu­
larly impressive as a means of linking observations and hypotheses. 
Consider the ghost hunting example. If there arc ghosts, then humans 
will observe spooky sounds in spooky places. Is this material implica-
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lion true? How would we know? The connection between
 hypothesis
and observation needs more detail. In traditional scienc
es, we can
sometimes deduce the implication from a theory. Consider 
something
simple, such the distance an object will travel in a fixed perio
d of time.
In classical mechanics this sort or problem is resolved usin
g one of
Newton's motion equations: e.g .• d = vl + ½ al
2 • With this equation, 
derived from the definition of acceleration in Newton's theo
ry, we can
generate falsifiable hypotheses. If Newton's motion equa
tion (1-1) is
true, then we will observe, for example, that an object tha
t begins at
rest and is accelerated at one meter per minute for one min
ute will be
displaced by half a meter (0). Such deductions arc not so o
bvious in
most cases, or even most sciences. To make matters worse, 
Quine (and
Duhcm) note that such deductions require auxiliary assum
ptions. For
example, the motion equations require the assumption that
 accelera­
tion is constant. Worse, lo record the initial conditions an
d resulting
displacement accurately, we need the assumption that light t
ravels in a
straight line. We need to understand how "seeing" works. A
nd, so on.
In order to lest a hypothesis on the Falsificationisl accoun
t, we need
a host of auxiliary assumptions (the constancy of accelera
tion during
the experiment, facts about optics. facts about our visual c
apacities,
and so on). This is a serious problem for Falsification.
Consider the form of the argument:
I. If (1-1 & A 1 & A2 ... & A.) is true, then O is true.
2. 0 is false.
3. Therefore, al least one member of the set ( H, ...• A )� 
is false. 
We cannot falsify 1-1, since it could always be one of the auxiliary as­
sumptions lhal is false. In this way, a falsifying observation does not 
determine whether or nol H is false-hence, this problem is known as 
Quine-Duhem Underdeterminalion. 
For our would-be ghost hunters, three puzzles emerge. First, can 
we formulate material implications linking hypotheses about ghosts 
to observations that arc sufficiently robust for a properly folsif ying, 
modus tollens? Second, are.sciences really required to offer sufficiently 
detailed theories such that we can deduce hypotheses and linked (by 
material implication) observations? And, finally, is the inference pat­
tern laid out by Falsilicalionism really a fruitful account of scientific 
inference in light of Quine-Duhem Underdetermination'! 
Most students found the ideas in Popper's work helpful to think 
about in relation to the ghost hunting experience, but very few pur­
sued these ideas in final papers. The idea that the distinction between 
science and non-science should be cashed oul in terms of testability 
(falsifiability), and the pervasiveness of the idea that scientists try 
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lo show their theories arc false, make Popperian Falsification worth 
grappling with. Additionally, the basics of Popper's view help students 
understand the idea that the observations that contribute to our belief 
or disbelief in scientific hypolheses must be linked lo said hypotheses 
by more than "common sense" or idiosyncratic experience. It is safe 
to say that material implication is probably not the right link, but it is 
far belier than what contemporary ghost hunter.,; have lo offer. 
Another, in hindsight, missed opportunity was to provide a greater 
discussion of Popper's work on ad hocery. In Popper's later work, he 
spent some time addressing the idea llrnl the rationale for preserving 
a hypothesis (and blaming an auxiliary) in light of 'falsifying' obser­
vations, or a modification to a hypothesis, was critical lo its status as 
scientific or unscientific. This would be of value in evaluating ghost 
hunting as it currently occurs, since 'ghost hunters' offer all sorts of ad 
hoc response to failed hunts, including psychologizing the ghost, failure 
lo properly place equipment, other background 'noise,' and so on. 28 
Likelihoodism 
Thinking of the scientific enterprise as comprised of testing hypotheses 
by way of observations offers several possibilities, beyond Popper's, for 
the testing relation. Bayesians suggest that testing consists in updating 
our confidence in a hypothesis on lhc basis of its degree of fit with 
observations. While I do go on to teach Bayesian Epistemology in my 
philosophy of science classes, a full discussion of such an epistemol­
ogy is not necessary to make some interesting points about the nature 
of science and its relation to ghost hunting. In this section, I focus 
on Likelihoodism, a somewhat narrower epistemology than Bayesian­
ism, and one that will serve to augment some of the more promising 
concepts from the previous section. 
Likelihoods arc a way of expressing the fit with data relation that 
is used to judge many scientific hypotheses. Likelihoods ·are specific 
form of conditional probability, and arc expressed mathematically as 
follows: Pr(OIH). This mathematical expression is read as follows: the 
probability of an observalion, 0, given that the hypothesis, H, is true. I 
will say a bil more about this shortly, but Likelihoods have been used 
to express the concept of evidence, and this is a key concept for our 
ghost hunting unit. 
Ian Hacking's Law of Likelihood provides a way of comparing 
hypotheses using Likelihoods: 
The ohservation O favors the hypothesis HI over the hypothesis H2 if and 
only if: Pr(OIH I)» Pr(OIH2)2Q 
The favoring relation described in the Law of Likelihood is often taken 
lo capture the idea that the observation, 0, provides evidence for HI 
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relative to H2. So, on this account, testing is f undamcntally contrastive:
we test one hypothesis relative to another. This idea is at the heart of
most of the statistical methods used by contemporary scientists. An
example tends to illuminate the ideas of evidence as fit with data, fun­
damentally contrastive, and, ultimately, its role in testing hypotheses.
Rossi and Vassella conducted a pediatric study of headaches and
tumors. 30 By carefully parsing symptoms, they were able to determine
that a cluster of symptoms were more telling in the identilication of
tumor over migraine. One symptom in particular serves to highlight
this point: nocturnal headache with vomiting was present in eleven
of sixty-seven children with brain tumors and only two of 600 with
migraine. This observation can be analyzed using the Law of Likeli­
hood: the observation of nocturnal headache with vomiting favors the
brain tumor hypothesis over the migrnine hypothesis, since the prob­
ability of the observation of nocturnal headache with vomiting given
the subject has a brain tumor is much higher than the probability of
the observation of nocturnal headache with vomiting given the subject
has migraines. So, the observation of nocturnal headache with vomiting
is evidence for brain tumors. rather than migraines. In fact, at a ratio
of about 55 to I, this symptom is pretty telling in favor of tumors.
The evidence provided by this particular symptom, while strong, does
not tell us whether or not a parlicular patient has a tumor, rather than
migraine. We can only answer this question, about our degree of cer­
tainty in the tumor hypothesis, if we know the probability a random
patient has a tumor in the first place. The reason for this is evident
in a fuller discussion or Bayesianism, but for our purposes il is suf­
ficient to note lhat evidence alone docs not tell us which hypothesis to
believe. Evidence, however, is the most basic concept in the testing of
hypotheses. and we can sec how that might work here. Likclihoodism,
thus, uses the fit with data relation, captured by the Likelihood, and
the observation in question, instead of material implication to describe
the basic machinery for judging hypolheses.
The inf erencc pattern Likelihoodism suggests for science is as
follows: 
I. Law of Likelihood
2. 0
3. Pr(OIH l )'s mathematical relation to Pr(OIH2)
4. Therefore, HI or H2 (depending on the relation found
in 3) is favored over lhe other. (We have evidence for
either HI or H2 relative to the other.)
Having described the ideas ahovc, I lhen had the students read chapter 
2 of Ellioll Sober's Philosof1h)' of Biology. 11 l focused on sections 1, 
2, and 7, but the entire chapter is worthwhile as it spends some tim� 
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cashing out Sober's notion of testability and addresses some of the 
Quinean points. 
One advantage of a probabilistic account, such as Bayesianism 
or Likelihoodism, has over Falsificationism is that it can provide the 
tools for demonstrating that science is not devastatingly limited (at 
best) by Quinc-Duhem Underdetermination. Sober offers a simple, but 
compelling example: 
I draw a card at random from a standard deck of cards wi1hout looking at it. 
The probability that it is the seven of hearts is 1/52. You then inform me that 
the card is red. This information confirms the hypothesis lhat lhc c;1rd is the 
seven of hearts, not in lhe sense of insuring that the hypothesis is true. hut 
in the sense of making the hypolhcsis more plausible than ii was before; the 
probability that I have the seven of hearts has just increased 10 1/26. However, 
this infonnation docs not confinn that the hypolhcsis that the card I hold is a 
seven; the probability that I have a seven remains what it was. namely l/13.J2 
It is the hypothesis that the card is a heart that is doing all the confirma­
tory work . The chance that you have a heart, based on the observation 
that the card is red, doubled (from 1/4 to ½). So, using conditional prob­
abilities in our scientific epistemology demonstrates a way around the 
Quine-Duhem challenge. This example also served to help my students 
get a handle on the probability math involved in Likelihood reasoning. 
How then would a ghost hunter proceed, if she were a scientist? 
If Likelihoodism is correct. the core process would be to determine 
a connection between the observations lhat would provide evidence 
for the hypothesis there is a ghost, rnther than some salient alternate 
hypothesis . In order to do this, there must be some way to fit the data 
to the ghosl hypotheses. In the tumor example above, this ic; done by 
fitting some observation (nocturnal headache with vomiting) to known 
cases of tumor, and a salient contrast, migraine, and determining the 
frequencies. The other common means of linking observations to hy­
potheses is by deducing them from theory, just as in the Popperian 
case. For example, Mendelian Genetics tells us that the probability of 
observing an offspring with dry earwax from a pair of heterozygote, 
human parents is 0.25.H As a result, our scientist ghost hunter would 
develop or seek a theory that provides probabilistic connections be­
tween ghostly obscn·ations and gho�ts, or to find cases of ghosts and 
determine the frequency of various observations. 
Additional Notes 
The sections above constitute the core of my discussion of ghost hunt­
ing in relation to teaching some basic scientific epbtemology. That said, 
I have taught Harman's "Inference lo lhe Best Explanation," excerpts 
from van Franssen 's The Scic11t({ic Image, Snhcr's "Contrastive Empiri-
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cism," Forster and Sober's "How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, 
or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions," and 
Mayo's "Novel Evidence and Severe Tests." I also think it would be 
interesting to teach Sobcr's "Tesrnbility," Leonelli's "What Counts as 
Scientific Data'! A Relational Framework." Longino's Science as Social 
Knowledxe: Values and Objectivity in Scient(fic Inquiry. excerpts from 
Whewell's Theory cl Scientific Method, Little's ''Rencctive Equilibrium 
and Justification," and Glymour's "Explanations, Tests, Unity and Ne­
cessity," in conjunction with a ghost hunting experience. Undoubtedly 
there arc many other options that could be connected. 
It is also worth noting that none of the students in either of my 
classes seemed to have been taken by the 'backfire effect' suggested 
by Schmaltz and Lilienfcld. and spelled out in Lewandowsky cl al. 34 
The 'backfire effect' occurs when someone comes to assign unwar­
ranted credulity to a position when it is presented in conjunction with 
warranted positions. Either way. we agree with Schmaltz and Lilienfeld 
that it is critical lo separate the good reasoning from the ghost hunting 
itself, and that continued framing of the good reasoning being taught 
is not a property of ghost hunting as it is done today (or maybe ever). 
Co11c/usio11 
Ghost hunting can be a fun and worthwhile addition to any course, we
have used contemporary ghost hunting as a way of teaching reason­
ing in three different ways, in three different classes. We taught it as
a unit, an extracurricular activity linked to a class, and as class in its
own right. To our minds, the benefits have been obvious-student en­
gagement. an expanded campus profile for our work. and a novel way
to help students engage with science and scientific reasoning, without
advanced knowledge of any particular science. Obviously. there are a
few drawbacks, but most have to do with planning for students to do
something outside of the classroom and in groups. In this paper, we
have provided a detailed set of notes and thoughts regarding a solid
introduction of ghost hunting to any class on reasoning, including
scienti fie reasoning. 
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Appendix: Koo/age's Ghost Hut11i11g Sca.ffolding 
Ghost H11111i11g Preparation Sheet 
Nature of the Haunting (Quick History) 
• Gather and record details regarding the haunting, ghost,
or site of search
Background Theory and Supplemental Research 
• Gather sources regarding the nature of ghosts, hauntings,
etc.




• Formulate a number of testable hypotheses combining
what you know from your work regarding the Nature of
the Haunting and your Background Theory and Supple­
mental Research
• Be sure to identify observable consequences of your
hypotheses
• Consider some possible techniques to confirm your hy­
potheses in light of the observable consequences you
have identifiell
• Note that hypotheses may best be described in terms of
your best account of the nature of science. E.g., If X were
true, C would be a matter of course, where C is something
surprising we observe, and X is a hypothesis (Pierce's Ab­
duction); If X, then Y, where X is your hypothesis and Y
is an observational consequence (Popper's Falsification);
or Pr(O I H), where O is an observation made probable
by the truth of H, a hypothesis (The Likelihood Principle)
Experimental Tools 
• Make a list or equipment you might need to gather the
observations that will allow you to check your hypotheses
• Collect your required equipment well before the day of
your hunt
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Prepare lo Record and Report 
• Prepare, in advance, a way of recording and keeping the
data and evidence you gather
• Record your work above in a clear and presentable manner
• Calibrate all Experimental Tools prior to your hunt, and
record the manner they were calibrated
• Organize your data and evidence upon return from your
hunt
Report 
• Prepare a presentation of your Ghost Hunt (5-10 minutes
in length)
• Be sure to highlight your scientific reasoning in the
presentation
• Be sure to present your best or most impressive evidence
Notes 
Thanks to Danielle Clevenger for her attention to, and comments on, several versions of 
this paper. Also, thanks to Tracy Sontag, Chris Foreman, Amelia Pamis, and Chris Dea­
cons. for their thoughts on ,i preliminary version of the ghost hunting unit. Also, thanks 
to Fred Harrington for feedback on an initial draft of this paper. 
I. "Eastern New Age Beliefs Widespread: Many Americans Mix Multiple Faiths."
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2009. 
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11it111es for Etp/oring the S11pemat11ml m·,rfcl. 
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Philosophy of Sciem:e." 11,i� method is an interesting response to this challenge. 
12. Sec the Appendix for the worksheet.
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w:1s to be as charitable as possible to !he idea that ghost hunting could he a science. That 
said. sec, for example, Martin Maimer, "1l1c Role of Metaphysical Naturalism in Science," 
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23. Larry Laudan. "A Confutation of Convergent Realism."
24. Ibid.
25. Harry Frankfurt, "Peirce's Notion of Ahduclion."
26. Ellis, Tire Ei·ery1hi11R G/10:,;1 H11111illR /Jook.
27. Popper, "Science."
28. llmnks lo an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this line of exploration. Inter­
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